In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic interpretation: In many circumstances it will neither reflect the expected extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single out a particularly "disruptive" subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This cardinality has an economic interpretation: the subset is a justified objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove multiple properties relevant for a workable measure of comparison. 
Introduction
While almost all matching theory only distinguishes between stable and unstable matchings, sometimes it is necessary to compare multiple unstable matchings.
For example, an experimental economist who simulates a matching market in the classroom or in a computer laboratory may nd that some of the experiments conducted did not result in stable matchings. In order to interpret the results, a comparison could be made regarding how close they are to stability. This problem was encountered in Niederle and Roth (2007) , and the authors solved it by taking the number of blocking pairs as a criterion to compare dierent matchings.
A related problem occured in Roth and Xing (1997) , where the matchings resulting from a simulation were not generally stable, yet had to be compared with each other. In a similar manner, the number of blocking agents, i.e. those players who are part of at least one blocking pair, was taken as a criterion of comparison.
1,2
Another necessity for the comparison of unstable matchings emerges when the matchmaker is not trying to achieve stability, but instead pursues a different goal. If the objective does not single out a unique matching, then one must be selected from those which fulll the primary requirement. Typically, such a situation occurs when the matchmaker primarily wants to maximize the number of matched pairs, i.e. wants to nd a maximal matching. This is a reasonable objective for numerous markets in which the social benet or the matchmaker's prot hinges on the number of matched players, while stability is deemed not so important. Biró et al. (2010) describe many such situations and mention the related literature. One of their examples is an organ exchange market, where the maximality of the matching is the primary goal:
The size of the matching determines the number of transplantations, which have the potential to be life saving. Moreover, blocking pairs existing in the nal matching will not cause further reshuing as the agents will usually not undergo additional operations just to resolve blocking pairs. Yet the satis-1 See in particular pp. 318-320 in their article.
2 Roth and Xing (1997) analyze the entry-level labor market for clinical psychologists, which they do not model as a marriage market, but as a many-to-one matching market. It is well known that many results derived for marriage markets carry over to many-to-one matching problems (cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) , chapter 5). Notably, the problems associated with counting blocking pairs, which motivate this paper, exist in the same way in many-to-one models. Therefore the reasoning presented here for marriage markets applies in the same way to many-to-one models, and the measure of instability advocated here can be naturally adapted to a many-to-one framework. For the conceptual purposes of this paper it is unnecessary to cope with the considerably higher complexity of many-to-one models.
2 faction the players obtain from the nal matching is of utmost importance:
Centralized matching regimes which are not accepted by the agents usually get undermined.
3 The more agents are not satised with the matchmaker's performance, the higher is the risk that the reputation of the centralized system will deteriorate, causing players to search for partners in decentralized ways.
Other applications mentioned in said article are school placement, assigning students to university projects, a certain bipartite matching problem of the US Navy, and even the optimal pairing of players in chess tournaments.
For these situations, in which stability is not the most important concern, Hamada et al. (2009) and Biró et al. (2010) develop algorithms which create maximal matchings with the least number of blocking pairs.
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Finally, there are situations in which stability cannot be achieved for exogenous reasons, and in the absence of a stable matching the matchmaker has to rank dierent unstable outcomes. For example, Khuller et al. (1994) develop an online matching algorithm for a situation in which all women are in the market from the start, while the men enter sequentially. As soon as a man has entered the market, the algorithm must match him to a woman immediately. No assignments once made can be undone on later stages. Obviously, no algorithm can guarantee that the outcome is stable. Thus Khuller et al. (1994) design their algorithm so as to minimize the expected number of blocking pairs for the resulting matching.
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Indeed, counting blocking pairs and taking their number as a criterion to compare matchings makes a lot of sense at rst sight.
6 A blocking pair is 3 Undermining occurs for example through the phenomenon called unraveling (cf. Niederle and Roth (2003) ). Also, the history of the NIMP algorithm provides evidence that acceptance by the participants is essential for the survival of a matching regime (cf. Roth (1984) ).
4 The paper by Hamada et al. (2009) builds on Biró et al. (2010) . The latter was already published preliminarily as a conference proceeding and as a working paper in 2008.
5 Real-world matching markets in which stability is practically unattainable are prevalent. Uncontrolled inux and outux of market participants, as modeled by Khuller et al. (1994) , can frequently be observed. In other (decentralized) markets, information decits may be the main factor for the absence of stable matchings (cf. Eriksson and Häggström (2008) ).
6 Without changing the concept qualitatively, one may also divide the number of blocking pairs which exist for a matching by the number of all possible pairs, as advocated by 3 a source of dissatisfaction on the part of its members. Therefore a matchmaker might lose customers and prots if too many players eventually nd themselves in blocking pairs. Moreover, one might consider the number of blocking pairs as a proxy for the amount of partner changes imminent at a given state of the market. This interpretation also corresponds in a direct way with the term measure of instability, which is used occasionally in the literature.
Despite the supercial reasonability of counting blocking pairs, we think that the concept is problematic. Often there is no connection between the satisfaction of the players with a certain matching and the number of blocking pairs. Consider the following example: let µ be a matching and let B(µ) be the collection of blocking pairs for µ. If B(µ) is no matching, these blocking pairs cannot be satised simultaneously.
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In the most extreme case, a given player m ∈ M (or w ∈ W ) is member of all pairs in B(µ). Of these blocking pairs, only one can be resolved. It seems questionable whether such blocking pairs would generate the same level of dissatisfaction as an equal number of blocking pairs which actually could be satised simultaneously.
In the outlined situation, there may be n dierent women {w 1 , . . . , w n } who form blocking pairs with m, but each of these women knows that m, if he could decide which of the blocking pairs was to be satised, would marry w := max m {w 1 , . . . , w n }. So if the dissatisfaction with the matching is based on rational considerations, essentially only one woman and one man would be discontent with the matching µ, namely w and m.
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If the set of blocking pairs whose cardinality is counted was a matching, a Eriksson and Häggström (2008) . This procedure is only necessary, however, if one wants to compare matchings from dierent markets. If the matchings to be compared are within the same market, as will be assumed throughout this paper, one does not lose anything by taking the absolute number of blocking pairs.
7 In this paper a matching is dened as a collection of pairs such that none of them share a player, see denition 2 on page 7. This denition was used before (for example in Blum and Rothblum (2002) ) and it is equivalent with the standard function denition in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 8 Our point may be further illustrated by the following example: A single super model forms blocking pairs with thousands of men in a population. But do these blocking pairs cause discomfort among rational men? We do not believe so. A rational man knows that the supermodel will by all likelihood not consider him to be the most attractive partner among those with whom she forms blocking pairs. The blocking pair in which he participates is rather fantasy than a real option. 4 feature of the concept we propose, this problem would entirely disappear.
Then the pairs contained in that set could be satised in parallel, and all of these blocking pairs would be forgone opportunities to improve the outcomes of the participating players. These improvements could have materialized by these players if they would not have participated in the centralized matching mechanism, causing justied dissatisfaction with the matchmaker.
Yet it is equally problematic to take the number of blocking pairs as a measure of the degree of instability of a matching. Again, n blocking pairs which have a player in common cannot be satised simultaneously, hence only one of the n pairs could actually trigger a partner change. 
9
This paper oers an alternative measure for comparing matchings. We believe that certain subsets of the blocking pairs have a particular signicance, both regarding their disruptive potential as well as in terms of player satisfaction. We call them permissible sets of blocking pairs for a matching. It will be shown in proposition 2 on page 12 that all permissible sets of blocking pairs for a matching have the same cardinality. So their cardinality can be used as a measure to compare matchings. A matching which has a higher value according to this measure is expected to show more reshuing as well as higher dissatisfaction among the players.
Moreover, we claim that a permissible set of blocking pairs constitutes not only a possible transformation of the market, but also a likely transformation 9 In a model with undisclosed preferences which get disclosed upon random encounters of the players, the total amount of blocking pairs would be an indicator for the expected readjustments within a certain time span or in a given amount of stages. This would be an interesting model, but it would go beyond the setting discussed here. Here we keep to the assumption that the existence of a blocking pair is known to the players who form it, as it is standard in most of matching theory. among shortsighted players. If D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs for a matching µ, then our claim is based on the fact that D(µ) can be interpreted as a justied objection against µ according to a bargaining set which has the appealing property that it coincides with the set of stable matchings.
So if one believes in the empirical relevance of bargaining set concepts and Gale-Shapley stability, one can conjecture that the blocking pairs which get satised at an unstable matching µ comprise a permissible set.
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Unfortunately, even if the set D(µ) of blocking pairs to be counted comprises a justied objection against µ, its size is just an indicator for the rst-order dynamics emerging from the given matching. The concept proposed here says nothing about further market transformations which could take place after the counted blocking pairs were resolved.
11 Therefore the use of the concept presented here as a measure of instability is limited. Yet it improves on the simple counting of blocking pairs, which cannot even predict the rst transformation of the market and does not allow for inference on the n th -order dynamics either. Furthermore, the limitation may not be so severe if divorces are costly, as it is the case in many practical applications. The more unattractive partner changes become, the more important becomes the rst transformation of the market, while multistage dynamics will be shorter and less likely to occur. The example of an organ exchange market, in which people refrain from undergoing further surgeries in order to resolve blocking pairs, was already mentioned.
At the core of the approach introduced here is the selection of a matching to be formed from the set B(µ) of blocking pairs for a matching µ. This is not trivial, as usually many matchings can be formed from the elements in B(µ). We oer a rule for this selection. It will be stated and formalized in Section 3, and the resulting permissible sets of blocking pairs will be interpreted economically in Section 4. Furthermore, these sets will be shown to have interesting and useful features in Sections 5, 7, and 8. The most important of these features is the fact that all permissible sets of blocking pairs have the same cardinality for a given matching, so that this cardinality constitutes a well-dened measure of comparison. Section 6 shows how to 10 More on empirical support for bargaining sets can be found in footnote 18 on page 11.
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The issue of n th -order dynamics emerging from a matching is briey discussed in Appendix B on page 26. 6 nd the permissible sets of blocking pairs for a given matching. Section 9 illuminates a connection between the measure put forward here and the total number of blocking pairs used previously. The paper is concluded with Section 10. In the Appendix B we look at n th -order dynamics which can be derived from the concept of permissible sets. (M, W, ) , where M and W are disjoint nite sets and is a set which contains for each m ∈ M a linear order m dened over the set {m} ∪ W .
Preliminaries Denition 1 (Marriage Market). A marriage market is a triplet

12
In the same way, contains for each w ∈ W a linear order w dened over the set {w} ∪ M .
We refer to as a preference prole. The item m, over which the preference order m is dened, stands for m's option of being single. Likewise the item w, over which the preference order w is dened, stands for w's option of being single. For x ∈ M ∪ W , the strict 13 order
As in Blum and Rothblum (2002) , we dene a matching to be a set of pairs, which is equivalent to the usual function denition of matchings:
Denition 2 (Matching). A matching in the marriage market (M, W, ) is a set µ ⊆ M × W such that if (m,ŵ), (m,w) ∈ µ, thenŵ =w if and only ifm =m.
If for m ∈ M there exists no w ∈ W with (m, w) ∈ µ, then we say that m is single under matching µ. Correspondingly, if for w ∈ W there exists no m ∈ M with (m, w) ∈ µ, then we say that w is single under matching µ.
To ease notation, for a pair (m, w) ∈ µ we will write µ(m) to denote m's partner under µ, i.e. µ(m) := w. In this case, we will also write µ(w) to denote w's partner under µ, i.e. µ(w) := m. If there is no pair in µ of which a player x ∈ M ∪ W is a member, then we denote by µ(x) the player x himself, i.e. µ(x) := x.
12 Linearity of an order means that it fullls antisymmetry, transitivity, and totality.
Due to antisymmetry, a linear order does not allow for ties between unequal elements: For z, y ∈ {m} ∪ W with z = y either holds z m y or y m z, but not both.
13 An order is strict if it fullls irreexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity.
Denition 3 (Blocking pair). Let µ be a matching. A pair (m, w) ∈ M × W with m w µ(w) and w m µ(m) is a blocking pair for the matching µ.
The set of blocking pairs which exist for a matching µ is denoted by B(µ).
Denition 4 (Individual Rationality). A matching µ is individually rational if for every player
Denition 5 (Stability, Gale and Shapley (1962) ). A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and no blocking pairs exist for µ.
The following notation will be used throughout the paper: For U ⊆ M × W we denote by p(U ) ⊆ M ∪ W the set of those players who are member of a pair in U , formally
Permissible collections of blocking pairs
We denote by D(µ) ⊆ B(µ) that set of blocking pairs whose cardinal- If m =m or w =ŵ, then exactly one of the following statements is true:
The proof of this lemma is provided in the appendix (page 24). Using domination, we state
Verbally, a blocking pair (m, w) will not be counted only if another blocking pair (m,ŵ) which dominates (m, w) will be counted. From an economic viewpoint, the formation of (m,ŵ) prevails over the formation of (m, w), because (m,ŵ) and (m, w) share a member who prefers his or her partner in (m,ŵ) and thus would refrain from entering (m, w).
14 A set of blocking pairs which fullls the Principles 1 and 2 is referred to as permissible. In Section 7 will be shown that a permissible set of blocking pairs for a matching µ is empty if and only if µ is a stable matching.
The economic basis of permissible sets of blocking pairs
In this section, we provide an economic motivation for the permissible sets of blocking pairs dened above. Klijn and Massó (2003) adapt the bargaining set of Zhou (1994) to marriage markets and prove that it coincides with the set of weakly stable 15 matchings. 16 Here we will take a dierent direction:
We will try to nd an economically reasonable denition of a bargaining set 14 For another economic interpretation of domination, drawing on the farsightedness of the players, see Klijn and Massó (2003) p. 94. 15 If all blocking pairs for a matching are dominated by other blocking pairs, then a matching is called weakly stable. Klijn and Massó (2003) show by example that the set of weakly stable matchings may be a superset of the set of stable matchings, i.e. there are marriage markets in which a matching µ is not stable, but for any (m, w) ∈ B(µ) exists a pair (m,w) ∈ B(µ) with (m, w) ∈ dom((m,w)).
16 The Zhou bargaining set is obtained from the bargaining set of Mas-Colell (1989) by replacing a weak inequality by a strict inequality in the denition of the objection and imposing further restrictions on the counterobjection. Both bargaining sets have interesting mathematical properties, a discussion of whom can be found in Peleg and Sudhölter (2007) .
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for marriage markets which coincides with the set of stable matchings. Why do we need such a bargaining set?
Our goal is to interpret permissible sets as justied objections of the participating players against the given matching. Because the cardinality of the permissible sets is our measure of matching comparison, it should be 0 if a matching is stable. This is an indispensable condition for the claim that our measure indicates the degree of instability of a matching in some sense. On the other hand, if there are blocking pairs for a matching, it is unstable, and thus our measure should not assume the value 0. In this case, there should be a nonempty permissible set and thus a nonempty justied objection against that matching. For these reasons we are looking for a bargaining set with two properties:
1. There should be no justied objection against a matching if and only if it is stable.
2. The justied objections against a matching should be the permissible sets.
Obviously, the bargaining set of Zhou (1994) and its adaptation by Klijn and Massó (2003) does not fulll our demands: There can be unstable matchings which are weakly stable, and which are therefore in the bargaining set of Klijn and Massó (2003) . So according to their concept, there exist no justied objections against these unstable matchings. In contrast, the following denition of a bargaining set has the desired features:
Denition 7 (Objection). An objection against a matching µ is a match-
Denition 8 (Counterobjection). A counterobjection against an objection S is a matching T = ∅, T ⊆ B(µ), T S, such that for any pair (m, w) ∈ T and any pair (m,ŵ) ∈ S holds (m, w) / ∈ dom((m,ŵ)).
As it is known from other bargaining set concepts, an objection for which no counterobjection exists is called justied.
In short, an objection S ⊆ B(µ) against a matching µ is a matching formed from blocking pairs for µ. A counterobjection T ⊆ B(µ) is a matching which is also formed from blocking pairs for µ and it consists only of pairs which are not dominated by pairs of the objection. This is economically reasonable: If a pair (m, w) ∈ T was dominated by a pair in S, then either m or w would strictly prefer to keep to the objection and the counterobjection could not form. If, on the other hand, all pairs in T were not dominated by pairs in S and hence T was a valid counterobjection, then the supporters of S would have no arguments against the formation of T . They would not nd a player participating in T whom they could convince to stay in S all players participating in T would weakly prefer T over S. In accordance with economic intuition, the condition T S rules out the possibility that an objection can be countered by itself or by a subset of itself, because in such a situation the counterobjection would yield exactly the same payo as the objection to all of its participants.
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The proof that there exists no justied objection against a matching µ if and only if µ is stable is provided in Section 7. The following result validates the interpretation of a permissible set D(µ) as a justied objection of a group of players against the matching µ. Proposition 1. D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs if and only if it is a justied objection against µ.
The proof, which has no aesthetic value, is given in the appendix on page 25.
In view of the preceding proposition, it becomes clear that our measure is the cardinality of groups of players who can come together to improve their outcome independently of the other players. In this way, they form an objection against a matching. But among such coalitions, only those are considered which cannot be blocked by counterobjections. If one accepts that in general bargaining concepts have real world signicance, it makes sense to attribute a strong potential to reshue a matching market to those coalitions which are justied objections.
18 Moreover, as this bargaining set coincides with the set of stable matchings, the conjecture that its justied objections play a 17 Remind that S and T are collections of pairs, not players. As the utility of a player is solely determined by the pair of which he or she is a member, no player in T would have a gain from forming a counterobjection T against S if T ⊆ S.
18 Section 11 of Maschler (1992) reviews empirical evidence for and against bargaining set concepts and discusses its validity. The data on which Maschler bases his analysis was both generated in laboratory experiments (pp. 638-641) and obtained from real world situations (pp. 641-642). In 1992 the empirical foundation of bargaining sets was controversial but encouraging. Maschler himself assumes a rather critical standpoint, while authors he cites, notably Kahan and Rapoport (1984) , are very positive about the empirical importance of bargaining sets.
signicant role in real world marriage markets is indirectly supported by the undoubted empirical relevance of Gale-Shapley stability.
Furthermore, dissatisfaction will particularly prevail among players who nd themselves in a justied objection (and not just in a blocking pair). If a player realizes that he or she is member of a justied objection against a matching, it does not only mean that an improvement for himself or herself was left out by the matchmaker. Aggravating would be the fact that without counterobjections, the improvement would be practically attainable through decentralized negotiations between the players.
Finally, Ehlers (2007) (2007)).
Without proof, we note that the permissible sets of blocking pairs for a matching µ comprise an internally stable set of matchings.
A workable measure to compare matchings
To evaluate the next result correctly, it is important to remind that by denition, any matching which is a subset of B(µ) is an objection. Moreover, even if for some reason all objections were formed by the same set of players, from the above denition does not follow that the counterobjections are formed by the same set of players: If a counterobjection T against an objection S contains a pair which is an element of S, it can be included in T or left out without changing the fact that T is a counterobjection against S. Considering these facts, it is somewhat surprising that every justied objection against a given matching µ is formed by the same set of players, as will be shown next.
Proposition 2. Let S and T be justied objections against an individually rational matching µ. Then p(S) = p(T ).
19
Proof. S and T are matchings, so for notational consistency we set µ S := S and µ T := T . Without loss of generality, assume there is a playerm ∈ M with m ∈ p(S)\p(T ). We will now derive a contradiction from this assumption. First of all, if µ S (m) ∈ p(S)\p(T ), then there is no pair in T which shares a member with (m, µ S (m)). Consequently, there is no pair (m,ŵ) ∈ T with 19 For the notation p(U ), see page 8.
(m, µ S (m)) ∈ dom((m,ŵ)) and so (m, µ S (m)) is a counterobjection against T , contradicting our assumption that T is a justied objection. So it must hold µ S (m) ∈ p(T ).
K is the set of players who do not have the same partners under µ S and µ T . Note thatm ∈ K. Now we employ a graph-theoretic argument. Construct a graph G = (K, E) whose vertices are the elements in the set K. Let there be an edge in E between m ∈ K and w ∈ K if (m, w) ∈ µ S ∪ µ T . 22 For the proof, one could also use the bi-choice (di-)graph of Klaus and Klijn (2010) .
Therefore one would rst have to show that in the bi-choice digraph of the matchings µ S and µ T , no two players point at each other. This is a requirement needed for Lemma 1 of Klaus et al. (2009) to hold. Afterwards, from their Lemma 1 follows that there are only cycles and loops in the bi-choice graph, implying that there is no simple chain.
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ing withm (i.e. v 1 =m). From (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ µ S follows inductively:
If we walk along the simple chain v 1 , . . . , v n , we recognize another rule:
This is shown by induction: Obviously, (2) holds for v 1 , because m is single under µ T but not under µ S . As µ S is an individually rational matching, m prefers his partner under µ S over being single under matching µ T . By contradiction, assume (2) would not be true for all j, and let 1 ≤ j ≤ n be the lowest integer such that (2) is not fullled. Furthermore, assume j to be odd (for an even j, the argument is symmetrical). Then for v j must hold
, and both v j and v j−1 prefer each other over their partners under µ S . Because in K are only players who have dierent partners under µ S and µ T , it is ensured that (v j , v j−1 ) / ∈ µ S . Although (v j , v j−1 ) ∈ B(µ)\µ S , there is no pair in µ S which dominates (v j , v j−1 ), contradicting our assumption that µ S was a justied objection against µ. This proves the correctness of (2). Now consider player v n : If v n is odd, then by (1) (v n , v n−1 ) ∈ µ T , while he is single under µ S (otherwise he would not be the last element of the simple chain). So individual rationality of µ T implies µ T (v n ) vn µ S (v n ), contradicting (2). In the same way, if v n is even, then by (1) (v n−1 , v n ) ∈ µ S , while she is single under µ T (otherwise she would not be the last element of the simple chain). So individual rationality of µ S implies µ S (v n ) vn µ T (v n ), again contradicting (2). If follows that there can be no component of the graph G which is a simple chain starting withm ∈ p(S)\p(T ), implying that there exists no playerm ∈ p(S)\p(T ).
Herewith it is proved that for a matching µ, all sets D(µ) have the same cardinality. So this number is well-dened and can be used as a measure of comparison.
6. Finding all permissible sets of blocking pairs for a given matching µ
Only if at least one permissible set of blocking pairs for a matching µ is identied, its elements can be counted. For a concept with practical aspirations, it is therefore essential to show how to nd a permissible set of blocking pairs for an arbitrary unstable matching µ. Beyond that, further analysis of the concept may make it necessary not only to identify one permissible set, but to nd all of them. Fortunately, there is a simple way to achieve this goal.
Let µ be an individually rational matching in the market (M, W, ).
i.e. the set of all players with whom x forms a blocking pair for µ. Furthermore, for any x ∈ M ∪ W we consider a preference order˜ x which is dened on the same domain as x .˜ x has the following properties:
Those comparisons not determined by the above rules must be chosen arbitrarily subject to transitivity and antisymmetry of the resulting order. Given a market (M, W, ) and an individually rational matching µ in this market, a preference order˜ x with the above two properties exists for any x ∈ M ∪ W .
This can be seen as follows: Clearly, the preferences
x for x ∈ M ∪ W already fulll (3). In two steps we can manipulate x to make it compatible with (4). At rst, we rank the single option x directly below the element min x B µ (x) and denote the resulting preference order by x . Afterwards, we assign to any element y / ∈ B µ (x) with y x x an arbitrary rank below x (avoiding ties). The resulting preference order fullls (3) and (4). Furthermore, it is transitive, total, and antisymmetric, because in our manipulation we did not introduce ties into˜ x and so the linearity of x carries over tõ
x . We need the following lemma:
23 As before, the relation˜ x is derived from˜ x by the rule a˜ x b ⇔ a˜ x b ∧ a = b.
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Lemma 2. Let µ be a matching in a market (M, W, ) and let (m, w) ∈ M × W be an individually rational pair 24 with (m, w) / ∈ µ. If there is no (m,ŵ) ∈ µ with (m, w) ∈ dom(m,ŵ), then (m, w) is a blocking pair for µ.
The proof is stated in the appendix on page 25. Now let µ be an unstable but individually rational matching in the market (M, W, ), and let˜ ˜ ˜ be a preference prole which is constructed according to the conditions (3) and (4) Proof. Form a stable matchingμ in the market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ). For x ∈ M ∪ W , the players preferred over the single option according to the preferences˜ x are those with whom x forms a blocking pair for µ. So from the fact thatμ is individually rational under preferences˜ ˜ ˜ followsμ ⊆ B(µ).
25 Moreover, µ = ∅, because B(µ) = ∅ and for any pair (m, w) ∈ B(µ) holds m˜ w w and w˜ m m by condition (4) above. So ifμ was the empty matching, then a pair (m, w) ∈ B(µ) would be a blocking pair forμ under preferences˜ ˜ ˜ , conicting withμ's stability in the market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ). Withμ ⊆ B(µ) and µ = ∅ we have established that the matchingμ is an objection against µ in the market (M, W, ). Next will be shown thatμ is justied. Assume by contradiction there would be a counterobjection T againstμ. Then because T μ, there exists a pair (m, w) ∈ T, (m, w) / ∈μ, such that for no pair (m,w) ∈μ holds (m, w) ∈ dom((m,w)). From (m, w) ∈ T ⊆ B(µ) follows that (m, w) is an individually rational pair in the original market (M, W, ), thus Lemma 2 ensures that (m, w) is a blocking pair forμ in (M, W, ).
Hence it holds m wμ (w) and w mμ (m). 25 As before, the set B(µ) is the set of blocking pairs for µ in the market (M, W, ).
But asμ is stable in (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ), it must hold that either m≺ wμ (w) or w≺ mμ (m). W.l.o.g. assume m≺ wμ (w).
From (m, w) ∈ B(µ) follows m ∈ B µ (w) and thus m˜ w w by (4). Therefore (6) impliesμ(w) = w, henceforth (μ(w), w) ∈μ. Withμ ⊆ B(µ) we conclude (μ(w), w) ∈ B(µ) and thus alsoμ(w) ∈ B µ (w).
We have shown that m,μ(w) ∈ B µ (w). But if this is true, from condition (3) and the rst part of (5) follows m˜ wμ (w).
Clearly, (6) and (7) (3) follows µ D (m) =ŵ˜ mw which means that (m,w) is no blocking pair for µ D in the market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ), contrary to our assumption. If [w =ŵ ∧m wm ] is true, the argument is symmetrical.
As a consequence, in order to nd all permissible sets of blocking pairs for a matching µ, we just have to construct a preference prole˜ ˜ ˜ with regard to µ and then compute the set of stable matchings in the market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ). Each of these matchings is a permissible set of blocking pairs for µ in the market (M, W, ).
26 An algorithm which can be applied to nd the set of stable matchings in the market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) was devised by Irving and Leather (1986) . If we are only interested in the cardinality of the permissible sets, of course it is sucient to compute just one stable matching in the market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) with the algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) .
We remark that Proposition 2 on page 12 could also be proved by making use of the well known result stated as Corollary 3 on page 20 together with Proposition 3 above. If all permissible sets of blocking pairs for a matching µ in a market (M, W, ) are in fact stable matchings in a manipulated market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) (Proposition 3), then the fact that the set of those players who are not single is the same at every stable matching in a market (Corollary 3) implies that all permissible sets of blocking pairs must be formed from the same set of players. However, by proving Proposition 2 independently of Corollary 3, it becomes clear that Proposition 2 directly follows from the Principles 1 and 2, through which permissible sets are dened, and does not depend on a hidden argument from the set of stable matchings.
A permissible set of blocking pairs for a matching µ is empty if and only if µ is stable
Now we come to the question under which condition nonemptiness of a permissible set is guaranteed. A permissible set D(µ) ⊆ B(µ) is an empty set if and only if µ is stable. Hence, according to proposition 1 there is no justied objection against a matching if and only if µ is stable. In particular, µ being a weakly stable matching (Klijn and Massó (2003) ) is not sucient for D(µ) to be empty. This is an important result, as it proves that the bargaining set presented in section 4 indeed coincides with the set of stable matchings.
Corollary 1 (to Proposition 3). There is no justied objection against an individually rational matching µ if and only if µ is stable. 27 Remind that by denition an objection is nonempty. Thus empty justied objections do not exist.
Proof. ⇐: If µ is stable, then there are no blocking pairs and thus there is no objection. ⇒: If µ is unstable, then let (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) be a marriage market where˜ ˜ ˜ was constructed with regard to µ. In the rst part of the proof of Proposition 3 was shown that any stable matching in (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) is a nonempty permissible set of blocking pairs for µ, i.e. a justied objection against µ.
Corollary 2 (to Corollary 1). If there exists an objection against a matching µ, then there exists a justied objection against µ.
Proof. If there exists an objection S against µ, then any pair (m, w) ∈ S is a blocking pair for µ. Thus µ is unstable. Hence, Corollary 1 ensures that there exists a justied objection against µ.
Permissible sets of blocking pairs and the set of stable matchings
Proposition 3 showed that for an arbitrary unstable matching µ in a marriage market (M, W, ) we can construct another marriage market (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) such that the stable matchings in (M, W,˜ ˜ ˜ ) are the permissible sets of blocking pairs for µ. Can we reverse the direction of this argument? If we have an arbitrary market (M, W, ), can we always nd a matching µ such that the set of stable matchings of (M, W, ) are the permissible sets of blocking pairs for µ? In this section that question is answered armatively. Surprisingly, the stable matchings in an arbitrary market (M, W, ) are the permissible sets of blocking pairs for the empty matching (the matching in which all players are single) of (M, W, ):
Proposition 4. Let µ be the empty matching in the market (M, W, ) . A matching µ is stable in (M, W, ) if and only if it is a permissible set of blocking pairs for the matching µ.
Proof. First assume µ is a stable matching in (M, W, ). Let (m, w) be a blocking pair for the empty matching such that (m, w) is not an element of µ . To establish that µ is a permissible set of blocking pairs for µ, it must be shown that (m, w) is dominated by a pair in µ . (m, w) cannot be a blocking pair for µ due to the stability of µ . So because of the strict preferences, it must hold µ (m) m w or µ (w) w m (or both), as otherwise (m, w) would block µ . But then (m, w) is dominated either by (m, µ (m)) ∈ µ or by (µ (w), w) ∈ µ . In the other direction, assume D is a permissible set of blocking pairs for µ. Then D is a matching in (M, W, ) (with all players who are not part of a pair in D being singles), and D is individually rational because D ⊆ B(µ). Corollary 3. Let µ, µ be stable matchings in a market (M, W, ) . Then a player x ∈ M ∪ W who is not single at the matching µ is also not single at the matching µ . Proof. By Proposition 4 both µ and µ are permissible sets of blocking pairs for the empty matching in the market (M, W, ), and thus justied objections against that matching. So from Proposition 2 follows p(µ) = p(µ ).
This result was proved in two dierent ways for marriage markets in McVitie and Wilson (1970) (theorem on page 298) and Gale and Sotomayor (1985) (Proposition 1). It was proved in Roth (1984) (m, w) be an arbitrary element in D(µ ) with x ∈ dom((m, w)). Dene a function f :
It will be shown that the function f (x) exists and that it is an injection. f (x) exists because any element x ∈ D(µ) which is not in D(µ ) must be dominated by an element in D(µ ) (Principle 2). So y(x) exists for each 
Conclusion
A measure to compare matchings is needed in situations in which GaleShapley stability is not a feasible or appropriate objective. Such situations can emerge in experimental economics, when the matchmaker pursues goals other than stability, or when particular market circumstances prevent the matchmaker from generating a stable matching. The number of blocking pairs or closely related criteria were deployed in previous papers (Khuller et al. (1994) , Roth and Xing (1997) , Niederle and Roth (2007 ), Hamada et al. (2009 ), Biró et al. (2010 ), and even some general properties on these measures of instability were derived in Eriksson and Häggström (2008) .
Here we argued that instead of counting all blocking pairs which exist for a matching, one should rather count a set of blocking pairs which comprises a possible and economically reasonable transformation of the market. This approach led to two principles for the set of blocking pairs to be counted:
The rst made sure that this set was really a matching, which means that it must not contain two or more pairs sharing a common member. The second principle was based on economic intuition. It stated that any blocking pair (m, w) for a matching µ was counted, unless one counted another blocking pair (m,w) for µ which dominated (m, w). The economic argument behind this principle is that the sole reason a blocking pair would not get satised should be the existence of another, dominating blocking pair which does get satised. Those sets of blocking pairs which fullled both principles were called permissible.
It was then shown that we can characterize the set of stable matchings as a bargaining set, and that according to this bargaining set the permissible sets of blocking pairs are justied objections of groups of players against the given matching. Furthermore, even if multiple dierent permissible sets of blocking pairs exist for a matching, they all have the same cardinality. This property makes the cardinality of permissible sets a practicable measure of matching comparison. Next, a method was presented to identify all permissible sets of blocking pairs existing for a matching. Then we established that there is no unstable matching which has an empty permissible set of blocking pairs, and no stable matching which has a non-empty permissible set of blocking pairs.
Finally, an example illustrated that for two matchings in the same market, the measure brought forward in this paper can be conversed to the absolute and relative numbers of blocking pairs.
In this theoretical work, one important question remained unanswered: Does the cardinality of a permissible set of blocking pairs empirically capture the extent of partner changes inherent in an unstable matching?
In order to substantiate such a claim, one could conduct a laboratory experiment and check whether the rst blocking pairs which get satised at a given unstable matching are suciently often permissible sets. Yet even if the relevance of permissible sets could be empirically supported, their cardinality would just predict the extent of the rst stage of the dynamic. Divorce cost may prevent excessive partner changes and cause dynamics to be short. Therefore we argued that the costlier divorces are, the more adequate it is to measure the degree of instability by the size of permissible sets.
However, in real world matching markets, the average number of players' partner changes may be easier observable than divorce costs (which are not necessarily monetary).
31 The lower the average number of partner changes is, the higher tends to be the share of the market readjustment occuring at the beginning of the dynamic, and the more relevant is the size of the permissible sets. Consequently, real world markets with low average numbers of partner changes would be the rst candidates for applying the measure introduced in this article.
point. This fact is illustrated by the upcoming example. To understand the example correctly, the following (trivial) result is useful:
Lemma 3. Let µ be a matching. If B(µ) is a matching, then there exists a unique permissible set of blocking pairs for µ. Again B(µ 1 ) = {(m 1 , w 3 ), (m 3 , w 2 )} is a matching, so by lemma 3 follows D(µ 1 ) = B(µ 1 ). Hence µ 2 = {(m 1 , w 3 ), (m 3 , w 2 )}.
34 As before, the preferences are only stated down to the single option.
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Again B(µ 2 ) = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 )} is a matching, so B(µ 2 ) = D(µ 2 ).
Therefore µ 3 = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 )} and µ 0 = µ 3 .
At each step of the transformation, all existing blocking pairs were satised simultaneously. So the example demonstrates that stability cannot always be reached if one satises more than one blocking pair at each matching. This is an interesting fact, given a sequence which leads to stability if one chooses just one blocking pair at a matching always exists (Roth and Vande Vate (1990) ). How do those matchings which can be reached through any of the sequences starting at µ 0 depend on µ 0 ? If one could prove nice properties of the sequences dened in this section, and empirical support could be delivered, they might be promising candidates for a genuine model of matching market microdynamics.
